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A Framework for Preemption Analysis
The decisions of the Supreme Court in cases involving preemption
of state law by federal statutes have often produced considerable con-
fusion' and criticism. 2 This Note argues that those decisions can be
rationalized according to the protection afforded by the state law in
question. Laws that protect the people inside state borders from
physical injury have received the greatest deference from the Court.
Laws that protect the people inside state borders from other dangers
have received less deference. State laws that purport to protect people
mostly outside state borders have received little deference. Recogni-
tion of these categories, as they are set out in this Note, can assist courts
as they deal with future preemption cases.
I. Categories for Preemption Analysis
It is useful to distinguish four possible relationships between na-
tional and state laws, which may conveniently be called "express pre-
emption," "express saving," "prohibition of dutiful conduct," and
"hindrance." Express preemption and express saving are direct rela-
tionships between national and state law. Express preemption occurs
when a national statute expressly forbids state regulation of a certain
type or expressly requires that national regulation be exclusive. Ex-
press saving is present when a national statute expressly forbids courts
to preempt state laws. Prohibition of dutiful conduct and hindrance
are indirect relationships, which involve more complex interactions
between state and national law. Prohibition of dutiful conduct is
present when state law requires someone to breach duties imposed by
national law. Hindrance occurs when state law interferes with op-
portunities created by national law, or with the performance of federal
duties.
Three possible relations between state law and the people it protects
may also be distinguished. "Extraterritorial protection" occurs when a
state law protects people mostly outside state borders. "Territorial pro-
tection" occurs when a state law protects a group of people who are
1. See, e.g., note 29 infra (contradictory inferences drawn by Court from presence of
"comprehensive" national requirements); notes 31 & 76 infra (contradictory inferences
drawn by Court from congressional failure to require an action).
2. See, e.g., Hirsch, Toward a New View of Federal Preemption, 1972 U. ILL. L.F. 515,
54547 (activist Court has not conformed to congressional expectations); Note, The Pre-
emption Doctrine: Shifting Perspectives on Federalism and the Burger Court, 75 COLUM.
L. REv. 623, 639 (1975) (Court has sometimes shown too little concern for state interests).
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mostly inside state borders. "Territorial protection of vital interests"
occurs when state law protects people mostly inside state borders from
physical injury.
These distinctions provide a framework for explaining the Court's
preemption cases. Extraterritorial protection has been preempted by a
mere showing of some hindrance. In contrast, territorial protection has
been preempted only if express preemption or prohibition of dutiful
conduct is present or if the state law substantially hinders conduct
essential to the achievement of the overall objective of a federal
statute. Territorial protection of vital interests has been on a still
higher tier, because physical injury is not usually deemed necessary to
achieve a national statutory purpose. Thus only express preemption or
prohibition of dutiful conduct are sure to preempt state statutes that
protect vital interests inside state borders.
A. Express Preemption
Express preemption occurs when a national statute expressly forbids
the type of state regulation in question or expressly requires that na-
tional regulation of the subject in question be exclusive. Express pre-
emption clauses typically command that "no state shall adopt" certain
requirements or that "no [requirements of a particular kind] shall be
imposed" by any state.3 The statutory command must be clear and
unambiguous 4 and must have the force of national law; even un-
ambiguous declarations in the legislative history of a national statute
have not sufficed.5 Statutory preemption clauses eliminate the need
3. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C.A. § 7543 (West 1978) (preempting regulation of automobile
emissions); 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (Supp. V 1975) (preempting literacy tests).
4. E.g., Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 147 (1963); H.P.
Welch Co. v. New Hampshire, 306 U.S. 79, 85 (1939); cf. Murdock v. City of Memphis,
87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 590, 618-19 (1875) (Congress must use "plain, unmistakable language"
to change longstanding practice that denies Supreme Court review of state court de-
terminations of state questions); Tribe, Intergovernmental Immunities in Litigation,
Taxation, and Regulation: Separation of Powers Issues In Controversies about Federalism,
89 HAM'. L. R v. 682, 691-97 (1976) (Congress must make "clear statement" to deprive
states of sovereign immunity).
5. For example, a House committee report on a national labor law declares that "by
the Labor Act Congress preempts the field . . . insofar as commerce within the meaning
of the Act is concerned." H.R. REP. No. 245, 80th Cong., Ist Sess. 44 (1947). Despite
this declaration the Court held that state regulation of certain strike activities regulated
by this national law "cannot fairly be said to be pre-empted without a clearer declara-
tion of congressional policy than we find here." UAW v. Russell. 356 U.S. 634, 646 (1958).
Legislative history was similarly ineffectual in, e.g., New York Dep't of Social Servs. v.
Dublino, 413 U.S. 405, 417 (1973). See Brief of Appellees at 21, 22; Brief of National
Welfare Rights Organization as Amicus Curiae at 39-43.
The Court has thus refused to treat legislative commentary as an authoritative com-
mand. See pp. 382-84 & note 121 infra. It has, however, sometimes used legislative
commentary to support the preemption of state laws substantially hindering conduct
necessary to give effect to a national statute. E.g., Street, Elec. Ry. & Motor Coach Em-
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for judicial inquiry into the overall purposes of national statutes and
into the effect of state laws on the implementation of those statutes. 6
In many cases Congress has expressly forbidden state attempts at
territorial protection.7 For example, it used an express preemption
clause to prohibit state voting laws that imposed literacy tests.8 It may
even forbid state laws that protect vital interests. Recent lower court
decisions have, for example, held that national statutes expressly pre-
empted state or local attempts to protect the lives of people from the
conduct of participants in interstate transportation.9 Similarly, the
Supreme Court itself recently acknowledged that Congress has nearly
absolute "power over areas of private endeavor, even when its exercise
may pre-empt express state-law determinations contrary to the result
which has commended itself to the collective wisdom of Congress."' 0
By enacting an express preemption clause, Congress can clearly com-
mand courts to find that state law is preempted.
B. Express Saving
Express saving is present when a national statute expressly forbids a
preemptive interpretation of national law and this command is ap-
plicable to the state law in question. Saving clauses typically command
ployees Div. 998 v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Bd., 340 U.S. 383, 397-98 (1951)
(peaceful conduct of labor organization; House report quoted); see pp. 382-87 infra
(explaining inference of such hindrance). Legislative history was used in the same way in
Guss v. Utah Labor Relations Bd., 353 U.S. 1, 9-10 (1957), a case in which the Court pre-
empted state law in order to protect the jurisdiction of the NLRB. See pp. 387-88 infra.
But the Court's use of legislative history was criticized as mistaken and its holding was
partially overruled by Congress. See Hirsch, supra note 2, at 546-47 & n.132. Two years
after Guss, the Court admitted that congressional guidance on labor preemption was un-
clear and did not attempt to support its holding by use of legislative history. See San
Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236, 238-46 (1959).
Very recently the Court has again used legislative history to support preemption in
Ray v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 435 U.S. 151, 174 (1978) (quoting House Report). In Ray,
however, special circumstances were present to support preemption. See pp. 380-81
infra.
6. Determination of express preemption is therefore simpler than the determination
of the degree to which state laws hinder achievement of a national statutory objective.
See pp. 382-88 infra.
7. See, e.g., Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430 U.S. 519, 530-32 (1977) (clause forbidding
state standard different from federal standard violated by state law prohibiting package
weight variations caused by "moisture loss during the course of good distribution prac-
tice"); Railway Employes' Dep't v. Hanson, 351 U.S. 225, 229 (1956) (clause commanding
that parties be permitted to make union security agreements "notwithstanding any other
provisions" of state law violated by state law prohibiting union security agreements).
8. 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (Supp. V 1975) (prohibiting use of literacy tests to deny voting
rights); see South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301 (1966) (applying this clause).
9. Exxon Corp. v. City of N.Y., 548 F.2d 1088 (2d Cir. 1977) (express preemption
of municipal air quality ordinance); Donelon v. New Orleans Terminal Co., 474 F.2d
1108 (sth Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 855 (1973) (express preemption of municipal safety
standards). But see, e.g., Chrysler Corp. v. Tofany, 419 F.2d 499 (2d Cir. 1969) (construing
preemption clause narrowly to avoid preempting state safety law).
10. National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 .U.S. 833, 840 (1976) (dictum).
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that "nothing [herein] shall be construed as preempting" certain state
laws or that "nothing [herein] shall be construed as authorizing" con-
duct forbidden by state law." Like preemption clauses, saving clauses
restrict the sphere of judicial inquiry. If a national statute expressly
saves certain state laws, courts have followed this command even if it
appears inconsistent with the overall purpose of the statute and even
if the state law forbids the exercise of opportunities expressly granted
by the national law.12 The Court, however, has not yet construed a
saving clause to apply to state laws forbidding the performance of
national duties.' 3
C. Prohibition of Dutiful Conduct
Prohibition of dutiful conduct occurs when national law expressly
imposes a duty to undertake certain conduct and state law expressly
forbids performance of this duty. These facts have established a ra-
11. See, e.g., 33 U.S.C. § 1321(o)(2) (Supp. V 1975) (saving state oil tanker liability
laws); 29 U.S.C. § 164(b) (1970) (saving state laws that prohibit contracts making union
membership condition of employment).
12. A good example is the regulation of labor unions. With the objective of fostering
collective 'bargaining, national law grants workers opportunities to organize in labor
unions and specifically authorizes the negotiation of union security agreements. 29
U.S.C. §§ 151, 157, 158(a)(3) (1970). Yet state prohibitions of union security agreements
are expressly saved, 29 U.S.C. § 164(b) (1970), and have been upheld by the Court despite
apparent conflict with the national statutory objective. See Retail Clerks Local 1625 v.
Schermerhorn, 375 U.S. 96, 103 (1963) ("There is thus conflict ... [here] but it is a conflict
sanctioned by Congress with directions to give the right of way to state laws .... ")
By forbidding courts to preempt certain state laws, a savings clause implicitly permits
preemption of other state laws. It is often argued that this implicit permission is a
congressional mandate to preempt the state laws that are not expressly saved. See, e.g.,
California v. Zook, 336 U.S. 725, 755-57 (1949) (Burton, J., dissenting); Brief of AFL-CIO
as Amicus Curiae at 35-36, Retail Clerks Local 1625 v. Schermerhorn, 373 U.S. 746 (1963);
Brief of Respondent Board of Trade at 21-24, Rice v. Board of Trade, 331 U.S. 247
(1947). But in each of the three cases cited, this argument was rejected, as the Court
upheld the state laws in question. In Schernerhorn, the Court construed the saving
clause broadly to apply to the state laws in question. 373 U.S. at 751-54, 757. In Zook,
the Court admitted that the state law was excluded from the saving clause, but nonethe-
less upheld it. 336 U.S. at 732, 737. In Rice, the Court admitted that the state law was
excluded from the saving clause, but still used this clause as "intrinsic evidence" to
justify upholding the state law in question. 331 U.S. at 255.
Not until 1978 did a litigant arguing the implied preemptive effect of saling clauses
succeed in the Supreme Court. See Ray v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 435 U.S. 151 (1978). In
rejecting a state limit on oil tanker size, the Court noted that federal law regulated this
subject and that the federal statute authorized higher state standards "'for structures
only,'" thus impliedly preempting higher state standards for vessels. Id. at 174. The
earlier Rice-Schermerhorn line of cases was not brought to the attention of the Court in
Ray. See Brief of Appellants at 34-35.
13. In a case in which state law forbade compliance with the Federal Power Com-
mission's requirements for river diversion, the Court construed a saving clause as inappli-
cable to the law, thus allowing preemption to "take its natural course." First Iowa
Hydro-Elec. Coop. v. FPC, 328 U.S. 152, 166-67, 176 (1946); see SEC v. National Sec., Inc.,
393 U.S. 453, 463 (1969) (stressing that state laws to which McCarran-Ferguson Act saving
clause applies do not forbid performance of national duties).
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tionale for preemption. By imposing express duties to perform certain
acts, a national statute indicates that these acts are necessary to achieve
its overall purpose.' 4 Even if the duty is imposed only on persons to
whom the national government has granted licenses or other forms of
largesse (and who could therefore avoid the impossibility of dual com-
pliance by giving up the federal largesse), the performance of the
national duty has been deemed necessary to achieve the overall pur-
pose of the statute.15 The performance of duties imposed by federal
agencies rather than by statute, however, has not been accepted as
necessary to the statutory purpose without an inquiry into the statutory
authority of the agency involved.10 In any case, the fact that states ex-
pressly forbid such conduct eliminates the need for judicial inquiry
into whether state law in some indirect way substantially hinders it.
The presence of a prohibition of dutiful conduct has often pre-
empted state attempts at territorial protection, whether the national
command was directed to private parties,' 7 federal executive officers,' 8
federal and state courts,' 9 or state administrators.2 0 National statutes
14. Cf. pp. 385-86 infra (describing process of determining necessity in absence of
statutory command).
15. For example, the grant of a commercial broadcasting license carries with it the
statutory duty to broadcast replies to political messages. 47 U.S.C. § 315 (Supp. Y 1975).
Therefore states may not prohibit reply broadcasts, "the very conduct the [national]
statute demands." Farmers Educ. & Coop. Union v. WDAY, Inc., 360 U.S. 525, 531 (1959).
Similarly, the grant of federal funds carries with it an obligation to distribute those
funds to all persons designated by Congress, despite state prohibitions against distribu-
tion. E.g., Townsend v. Swank, 404 U.S. 282 (1971). Federal agencies may also impose
duties conditioned on receipt of benefits. E.g., First-Iowa Hydro Elec. Coop. v. FPC, 328
U.S. 152, 162, 166, 168 (1946) (diversion of river as condition for grant of permission to
build dam).
16. For example, in First-Iowa Hydro Elec. Coop. v. FPC, 328 U.S. 152 (1946), the FPC
had imposed a requirement of river diversion. State law prohibited diversion of the river.
Before preempting the state law, the Court examined the national statute and the facts,
in essence reviewing the FPC's interpretation of the national statutory objective and of
the consequent necessity for river diversion. 328 U.S. at 162, 166-74, 180 & n.23. For a
case in which the Court's review of agency action did not lead to preemption, see
Regents of Univ. Sys. v. Carroll, 338 U.S. 586, 591-93, 600-02 (1950) (despite FCC's condi-
tional requirement of nullification of contract, state court can require performance of
contract); cf. Organized Village of Kake v. Egan, 369 U.S. 60, 63, 76 (1962) (agency lacks
authority to permit fishing forbidden by state law).
17. See, e.g., Schwegmann Bros. v. Calvert Distillers Corp., 341 U.S. 384 (1951).
18. See, e.g., Johnson v. Maryland, 254 U.S. 51, 55-56 (1920).
19. See, e.g., Davis v. Elmira Say. Bank, 161 U.S. 275 (1896) (national law forbade
court to give preferences in distribution of assets of bankrupt; state law required court
to give preference). In federal common law cases, a federal court both imposes and per-
forms a national duty. See, e.g., Clearfield Trust Co. v. United States, 318 U.S. 363 (1942)
(state law forbade court to recognize claim when bank given untimely notice; federal
common law required court to recognize claim of United States, which gave untimely
notice to bank).
20. See, e.g., California v. Taylor, 353 U.S. 553 (1956) (duties imposed by Railway
Labor Act are binding on state administrators in position of employers of railroad
workers).
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have similarly required state administrators to distribute national
funds to needy people, thus preempting state limitations on such
distributions.
21
Even state laws protecting vital interests may be preempted if they
prohibit performance of national duties. For example, no state may
protect the lives of its citizens by commanding national officers to
breach their national duty in order to retain custody of persons
charged with crime. In barring such state protection, Ableman v.
Booth22 and Tarble's Case 2 3 both emphasized the fact that federal
courts provided an alternative means of protecting the lives of these
persons.
2 4
Nevertheless, a national statute can require the violation of state laws
without providing national protection for the people deprived of the
benefit of state laws. For example, state civil service laws sometimes
require state administrators to pay no more than a certain wage. To
protect the economic interests of state employees, a national statute
might command state administrators to raise wages without providing
funds to do So.2 5 The state employees in question might work in
agencies that protect the lives of people inside the state. If so, by
21. See, e.g., Townsend v. Swank, 404 U.S. 282, 285 (1971) (state law forbade state
administrators to give aid for dependent children to college students; national law re-
quired administrators to give AFDC payments to all eligible individuals, and defined
"dependent child" to include college students). See generally Dam, The American Fiscal
Constitution, 44 U. CHI. L. REv. 271 (1977).
22. 62 U.S. (21 How.) 506 (1858).
23. 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 397 (1872).
24. See Ableman v. Booth, 62 U.S. (21 How.) 506, 513, 520-23 (1858); Tarble's Case, 80
U.S. (13 Wall.) 397, 411 (1872). For a discussion stressing the importance of state courts,
and questioning whether Congress could deprive them of the ability to protect persons'
lives without providing an alternative, federal means of protection, see P. BATOR, P.
MISHKIN, D. SHAPIRO & H. 'VECHSLER, HART AND WECHSLER'S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND
THE FEDERAL SYSTEM! 359-60, 428 (2d ed. 1973) [hereinafter cited as HART & WECHSLER].
The Court may also require alternative federal protection for other important human
values. For example, federal protection against economic exploitation was apparently not
present in Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith v. Ware, 414 U.S. 117 (1973). Prohibi-
tion of dutiful conduct was present, as the petitioner noted:
Section 229 of the California Labor Code prohibits arbitration of wage disputes
between employer and employee . . . unless arbitration is required by a collective
bargaining agreement. In contrast, Rule 347(b) of the New York Stock Exchange,
promulgated under section 6 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, requires arbitra-
tion of employment disputes between member firms and their employees.
Brief for Petitioner at 11.
The petitioner also noted that the formulation of rules such as Rule 347(b) was a
"statutory duty" of the Exchange. Id. at 16-22. But the Court noted that this rule was
not subject to SEC review or modification. 414 U.S. at 134-35. The Court was persuaded
that preemption was not "necessary to the furtherance of congressional aims and ob-
jectives." Id. at 126-27. The Court therefore upheld the state law "to protect the worker
from the exploitative employer." Id. at 131.
25. Thus this law would differ from the national law in, e.g., Townsend v. Swank,
404 U.S. 282 (1971). See note 15 supra.
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forcing a reduction in the work force, the national command might
substantially reduce the protection that states can give to the lives of
people,26 and the national statute might not provide any alternative
national organization to protect these people.2 7 Thus an overall reduc-
tion in the protection given to vital interests might be a necessary
consequence of enforcing national law in this case.
28
D. Hindrance
Hindrance is present when national law leaves opportunities free of
restriction or restricts opportunities by imposing duties, and state law
increases the difficulty of taking these opportunities or of performing
these duties. Unlike express preemption cases, hindrance cases do not
involve a national statutory command forbidding states to regulate.
In hindrance cases, as in cases of prohibition of dutiful conduct, pre-
emption has been a function of the relations between national law,
state law, and certain conduct.
Conduct can be related to national law by regulation or by non-
regulation. National law may regulate conduct by imposing duties.
When these duties are most numerous, national regulation has been
termed "comprehensive." 29 The Court has sometimes referred to
26. Because the national law regulates the internal relations of state agencies, it
would affect each state citizen only indirectly, and only in common with all members
of the public inside the state. Therefore even if a private person were deprived of fire
or police protection as an indirect result of this national statute, such a private in-
dividual would probably lack standing to challenge it. See United States v. Richardson,
418 U.S. 166, 176-78 (1974). But see Choper, The Scope of National Power Vis it Vis the
States: The Dispensability of Judicial Review, 86 YALE L.J. 1552, 1558-59 & n.27 (1977)
(individual rights claims are "primary and independent" of claims relating to restriction
of state protective abilities).
27. Thus the national statute would differ from the statute in, e.g., Tarble's Case, 80
U.S. (13 Wall.) 397, 411 (1872) (federal courts available to issue habeas corpus). But cf.
Prigg v. Pennsylvania, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 539 (1842) (state law forbade anyone to aid
recapture of fugitive from slavery; national statute required magistrates to aid return of
fugitives to slave state, and did not provide alternative national protection for life and
liberty of fugitives).
28. Yet judicial enforcement of such a national law may not be inevitable. See National
League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976) (attempts by Congress to prescribe minimum
wages and maximum hours for state employees held unconstitutional); cf. note 79 infra
(constitutional questions involved in preemption cases).
29. It is often argued that "comprehensive" or "pervasive" national regulation leaves
no room for state regulation. See, e.g., Brief of Respondents at 8-9, 23, DeCanas v. Bica,
424 U.S. 351 (1976); Brief of the United States as Amicus Curiae at 5, 7-23, Head v. New
Mexico Bd. of Examiners, 374 U.S. 424 (1963); Hirsch, supra note 2, at 530-31, 548-51;
Note, supra note 2, at 625, 633-37 & n.64. This argument has often failed. See, e.g.,
DeCanas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351, 356 (1976); Head v. New Mexico Bd. of Examiners, 374
U.S. 424, 429 (1963). Pervasive national regulation may show only that a problem is so
complex that federal agencies must work along with state agencies to solve it. DeCanas v.
Bica, 424 U.S. 351, 357-60 (1976); New York Dep't of Social Servs. v. Dublino, 413 U.S.
405, 413, 415 (1973).
The argument based on the inherent preemptive effect of pervasive national regulation
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"potential conflict" in finding preemption necessary to ensure per-
formance of these duties.30 National law may leave conduct free of
regulation by not imposing duties3l or by granting privileges or rights
to engage in such conduct. 32 These opportunities are most numerous
when national law expressly grants "full freedom" for conductY3 The
is derived from a dictum in Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947)
("federal regulation may be so pervasive as to make reasonable the inference that Con-
gress left no room for the States"). Rice's holding, however, rested on an express preemp-
tion clause. Id. at 229. In a companion case, Rice v. Board of Trade, 331 U.S. 247 (1947),
there was no express preemption clause, see id. at 253, but there was comprehensive na-
tional regulation, id. at 250-53. Despite this comprehensive national regulation, most of
the state law was upheld. Id. at 253, 256. The dictum in Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp.
was supported by citation to two cases. 331 U.S. at 230. In one, Cloverleaf Butter Co. v.
Patterson, 315 U.S. 148, 168-69 (1942), the preempted state regulation protected con-
sumers most of whom resided in other states. Id. at 150, 166 (interstate consumers of
reprocessed butter); see pp. 372-74 infra (relevance of class of people protected in pre-
emption cases). But cf. Braden, Umpire to the Federal System, 10 U. CM L. REV. 27,
28-36 (1942) (criticizing Cloverleaf). In the other case, Pennsylvania R.R. v. Public Serv.
Comm'n, 250 U.S. 566 (1919), the preempted state regulation protected people working
in interstate commerce. See id. at 567, 569 (crewmen on iiterstate railroad trains). But
see Colorado Anti-Discrimination Comm'n v. Continental Air Lines, 372 U.S. 714, 725
(1963) (upholding state law protecting people working in interstate commerce; "impossible
... to believe" national regulation so pervasive as to preempt state law).
30. In some cases a national agency has a duty to specify the relationship between
national law and conduct hindered by the laws of a state or locality, but has not yet
performed this duty. "Potential conflict" exists because the agency might rule that such
conduct is necessary to achieve a national statutory objective. In San Diego Bldg. Trades
Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236 (1959), for example, the NLRB had not yet determined
whether to prohibit or protect union activity that a state court had punished. Similarly,
the warehouse financing hindered by the state regulation upheld in Rice v. Santa Fe
Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 237 (1947), had not yet been required by the Secretary of
Agriculture.
"Potential conflict" should be distinguished from "future hindrance," which exists
when the relationship between state law and private conduct is speculative. A state
agency may have authority to hinder certain conduct, but may not yet have exercised
this authority. By itself, the mere possibility of future hindrance may be insufficient to
create a concrete dispute. See, e.g., Askew v. American Waterways Operators, Inc., 411 U.S.
325, 336-37 (1973).
When past hindrances have created a concrete dispute, courts may consider the
probability of future hindrance. See, e.g., City of Burbank v. Lockheed Air Terminal,
Inc., 411 U.S. 624, 628, 638-39 (1973); Cloverleaf Butter Co. v. Patterson, 315 U.S. 148,
168-69 (1942). A high probability of future hindrance may be inferred from earlier cases
showing a persistent hostility to the hindered activity. See p. 388 infra (persistent
hostility as one of four factors leading to wholesale preemption).
31. For example, in Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52 (1941), the Court held that be-
cause national law failed to impose on aliens a duty to register in police stations or to
carry identification cards, states were barred from imposing these duties. Id. at 73-74. But
national failure to impose a duty often has no preemptive effect. In Southern Pac.
Co. v. Arizona ex rel. Sullivan, 325 U.S. 761 (1945), congressional refusal to require rail.
roads to use short trains was cited as a reason for upholding a state law imposing this
requirement. Id. at 764-66.
32. See, e.g., 47 U.S.C. § 326 (1970) (protecting free speech rights of radio broad-
casters); 46 U.S.C. § 251 (1970) (privileges of vessels in coasting trade).
33. See, e.g., Hill v. Florida ex rel. Watson, 325 U.S. 538 (1945) (preempting, on basis
of 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1970), a state law barring convicted felons from serving as union




Court has sometimes referred to "permitted" or "protected" conduct
in discussing the opportunities. 34
Conduct can be hindered by state legislation in direct and indirect
ways. States hinder conduct directly by forbidding it or by imposing
penalties on it.35 In Youngdahl v. Rainfair, Inc.,36 for example, a state
court enjoined union members from verbally harassing strikebreakers.
The union argued that this prohibition restricted workers in the
exercise of their national statutory right to engage in "concerted
activity' 37 for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid.
States may also hinder conduct directly by conditioning the op-
portunity to engage in the conduct on compliance with certain require-
ments. Tie burden of meeting these requirements may reduce an
actor's ability or willingness to engage in the conduct in question. In
Askew v. American Waterways Operators, Inc.,38 for example, state law
imposed very high oil spill financial responsibility requirements on
vessels navigating the state coast. Vessel operators and trade associations
noted the impossibility of compliance with state law, and showed that
the state law restricted opportunities existing under national inspec-
tion and licensing laws. 9
States may hinder conduct indirectly by reducing the willingness or
ability of third parties to cooperate with it. In Florida Lime & Avocado
Growers, Inc. v. Paul,40 California forbade distributors to sell fruit
that failed to pass an "oil content" test. Florida distributors argued
that this test had been expressly rejected by the Department of Agri-
culture and that the test reduced their ability to market fruit in
cooperation with the Department's performance of its statutory duty
to foster "orderly marketing" of fruit.
4 1
States may also hinder conduct indirectly by increasing the willing-
ness or ability of third parties to hinder the conduct. In UAW v.
Russell,42 the state allowed juries to require that union members pay
punitive damages to strikebreakers. The union argued that such law-
34. E.g., Lodge 76, Int'l Ass'n of Machinists v. Wisconsin Employmcnt Relations
Comm'n, 427 U.S. 132, 140-46 (1976); Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 74 (1941).
35. Prohibition of dutiful conduct, see pp. 366-69 supra, is a particular kind of direct
hindrance of national duties. It is analyzed separately from other kinds of hindrance be-
cause it raises simpler questions. See id.
36. 355 U.S. 131 (1957).
37. Brief for Petitioners at 75-76, 86-90.
38. 411 U.S. 325 (1973).
39. Brief of Appellees American Waterways Operators, Inc. at 40-41; Brief of Ap-
pellees American Institute of Merchant Shipping at 24, 40-42.
40. 373 U.S. 132 (1963).
41. Appellants' Brief at 31-33, 39-40, 44-51, 59, 88-89; see 7 U.S.C. § 602 (1976) (Secre-
tary's duty).
42. 356 U.S. 634 (1958).
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suits restricted the union workers' "full freedom of association . .. for
... mutual aid or protection." 43 The union also argued that such law-
suits hindered the NLRB's performance of its statutory duty of "inter-
balancing" the interests of participants in labor disputes.
44
Thus states may hinder, directly or indirectly, the exercise of op-
portunities or the performance of duties existing under national law.
Yet in Youngdahl v. Rainfair, Askew v. American Waterways Opera-
tors, Inc., Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, and UAW v.
Russell, hindrance failed to preempt state law. Hindrance has been
preemptive only under certain circumstances. To identify these cir-
cumstances, it is necessary to examine various aspects of the preemp-
tion question more closely.
II. Hindrance of the Achievement of National Objectives-An
Analysis of the Relevant Factors
In order to elucidate the problems presented in hindrance cases, this
section will first examine one key factor-the protection provided by
the state law in question. It will then seek to analyze the decision that
a court must make as it attempts both to state the objective being
pursued by a national statute, and to infer whether a particular form
of conduct is necessary to the achievement of that objective and is being
hindered by state law. Finally, it will explore the decision a court must
make about how broad its preemption ruling will be.
A. The Protection Provided by State Law
An attempt to make sense of past hindrance cases must begin with
an examination of the various interests that a state may seek to protect.
This factor has often been determinative of the outcome in cases in-
volving state laws that interfere with duties or opportunities created
by the federal government. A state engages in extraterritorial protec-
tion when it protects people mostly outside its borders, and in ter-
ritorial protection when it protects people mostly inside its borders.
This distinction "is a fundamental one." 45 When a state law aims at
extraterritorial protection and hinders the performance of national
duties, courts have generally held that the law is preempted. State laws
aimed at territorial protection are much less likely to be preempted.
43. National Labor Relations Act § 1, 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1970); see Brief for Petitioners
at 20-23, 58-64.
44. Brief for Petitioners at 20, 22-29, 35-38, 56-57, 62.
45. Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 145 (1963).
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For many years, national law imposed on the Department of Agricul-
ture a duty to foster healthful production of butter;46 it still imposes
on the Department a duty to foster interstate trading of tobacco 47 and
fruit.48 In Cloverleaf Butter Co. v. Patterson,49 a state law prevented a
dairy from submitting butter to the Department for inspection. In
Campbell v. Hussey,50 state labeling requirements enabled buyers to
discriminate among tobaccos from different states, thus increasing the
buyers' ability to avoid interstate trade with certain states. In Florida
Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul,51 decided two years after
Campbell, state law forebade distributors to sell part of the Florida
avocado crop, thus hindering interstate trade in fruit. The state laws
in Cloverleaf and Campbell, which protected buyers mostly outside
state borders,5 2 were preempted. But in Florida Lime the Court up-
held the state's attempt to protect "the interests of that State's con-
sumers of the fruit."
5 3
The distinction between territorial and extraterritorial protection
was also relevant when states hindered the FBI in the performance of
its duties in Pennsylvania v. Nelson5 4 and Uphaus v. Wyman.5 5 Na-
tional law imposed on the FBI a duty to prevent sedition against
national or state governments.56 State investigations of sedition reduced
the willingness and ability of third parties to give information to the
FBI.57 On the basis of this indirect hindrance, a state prosecution for
sedition against the national government was preempted in Nelson. s
But in Uphaus the Court held that the rationale of Nelson did not
preempt a state investigation of sedition against the state itself.5 9 Thus
46. Int. Rev. Code of 1939 § 2325 (repealed 1976).
47. See 7 U.S.C. § 511a (1976).
48. 7 U.S.C. §§ 601-602 (1976).
49. 315 U.S. 148 (1942).
50. 368 U.S. 297 (1961).
51. 373 U.S. 132 (1963).
52. Ninety percent of the butter subject to state inspection in Cloverleaf was shipped
to buyers outside the state. 315 U.S. at 150, 166. Nearly 100% of the tobacco subject to
state regulation in Campbell was sold to out-of-state buyers. 368 U.S. at 298-99.
53. 373 U.S. at 145. The Court in Florida Lime distinguished Cloverleaf in terms of
the different character of the protected class. It distinguished Campbell on other grounds,
by emphasizing that a congressional desire for uniformity was a key factor in the latter
case. Id. at 146-47. But see p. 384 infra (dissenters in Florida Lime found congressional
desire for uniformity).
54. 350 U.S. 497 (1956).
55. 360 U.S. 72 (1959).
56. 18 U.S.C. § 2385 (1976).
57. See, e.g., Pennsylvania v. Nelson, 350 U.S. 497, 506-07 (1956) (quoting warnings of
President and FBI Director against state agencies' interference with information flow to
FBI).
58. See 350 U.S. at 499, 505-09 (sedition against United States is not local offense; state
hindrance of FBI is preempted).
59. 360 U.S. at 76.
373
The Yale Law Journal
hindrance of dutiful conduct preempted a state's attempt at extra-
territorial protection, but not at territorial protection.60
Territorial protection of vital interests, on the other hand, is the
category that is most impervious to preemption. If state laws protect
people mostly inside the state from physical injury, they have gen-
erally been upheld even if they substantially hinder conduct that ap-
pears necessary to achieve a central purpose of national law. For
example, in Maurer v. Hamilton6' a national statute declared it an
express "policy of Congress to regulate transportation by motor carriers
in such manner as to . .. foster sound economic conditions" and to
"promote adequate, economical, and efficient service by motor car-
riers." 62 The statute commanded that "[i]t shall be the duty of the
[ICC] [t]o regulate common carriers by motor vehicle as provided in
this part." 63 It also protected "the right of the carrier to add to his
or its equipment and facilities ... as the development of the business
and the demands of the public shall require." 64 To exercise this right,
a carrier attempted to use "car over cab" trailers to improve the
economy and efficiency of its interstate operations. But state law
forbade these trailers as unsafe65 and thus forbade conduct that ap-
peared instrumental to the express purpose of national law. Moreover,
the ICC had studied these trailers and concluded that they should not
be prohibited as unsafe.6 The state prohibition thus appeared to
hinder the ICC's performance of its express duty of fostering economi-
cal transportation. Yet the Court unanimously upheld the state law.
67
Noting the state finding that the trailers were unsafe, the Court
repeatedly stressed the need to protect human life from highway ac-
60. One preemption case indicates that certain regulations of aliens can only be
justified as extraterritorial protection. In Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52 (1941),
Pennsylvania argued that its alien registration statute combatted a threat to life and
property inside the state. See Brief for Appellants at 7-9, 13, 15, 22. But the Court
countered that the aliens in question were "perfectly law-abiding." 312 U.S. at 66. Dis-
crimination against and among such foreign nationals was an aspect of the foreign
relations power, which the national government exercises to protect the states as a whole.
Id. at 63-66. A recent case, Douglas v. Seacoast Prods., Inc., 431 U.S. 265 (1977), resembles
Hines because it indicates that aliens cannot be deemed to pose any distinctive hazard to
state interests. See id. at 285 & n.21. But cf. DeCanas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351, 355-57 (1976)
(state law against employment of illegal aliens is justifiable as protection of workers
within state).
61. 309 U.S. 598 (1940).
62. Motor Carrier Act of 1935, ch. 498, § 202(a), 49 Stat. 543 (1935) (current version at
49 U.S.C. preceding § 1 (1970)).
63. Id. § 204(a) (current version at 49 U.S.C. § 304(a) (1970)).
64. Id. § 208(a) (current version at 49 U.S.C. § 308(a) (1970)).
65. 309 U.S. at 599-601.
66. Id. at 602.
67. Id. at 599, 617; see note 84 infra (rationale of Maurer).
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cidents. s In light of this need; and absent a more explicit congressional
directive, the relation between the national law and the carrier's con-
duct did not immunize this conduct from state prohibition.09 Cases
before and after Maurer have similarly preserved state protection of
human life.
70
Yet Maurer marked a significant change in the method by which
the Court preserved state power to protect vital interests. Prior to
the 1930s the Court often avoided preemption by simply invalidating
national laws that might arguably have restricted state power to protect
people inside state borders. During that era the Court followed the
doctrine that national and state regulation were mutually exclusive: 71
68. Id. at 600-01, 605-06, 608-11, 616.
69. See id. at 614-17.
70. See. e.g., Head v. New Mexico Bd. of Examiners, 374 U.S. 424, 428-29 (1963) (state
restriction addressed to health); California v. Zook, 336 U.S. 725 (1949) (safety); Atlantic
Coast Line R.R. v. Georgia, 234 U.S. 280 (1914) (afety); Steamship Co. v. Joliffe, 69 U.S.
(2 Wall.) 450, 460, 463 (1865) (safety). But see pp. 365, 368 supra & pp. 379-81 infra (state
protection of safety preempted in certain cases).
These cases and others, see, e.g., Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373
U.S. 132 (1963) (state anti-fraud law); Savage v. Jones, 223 U.S. 501 (1912) (same), con-
tradict the thesis of Note, supra note 2, at 626-27, 639 (indicating Court before 1930 made
"expansive judicial assessments of federally regulated subject matter" and in Warren era
showed "little regard for countervailing state concerns").
One commentator, see Note, Pre-emption as a Preferential Ground: A New Canon of
Construction, 12 STAN. L. REV. 208, 220 (1959), has suggested that Maurer is inconsistent
with Castle v. Ha)s Freight Lines, Inc., 348 U.S. 61 (1954). But the state laws in Maurer
and Castle prohibited conduct bearing different relationships to national law. In Maurer
state law forbade all trucking companies to use a particular truck. In Castle a state
agency forbade a particular trucking company to use certain public highways specified as
routes by that company's ICC certificate of convenience and necessity. As the Court in
Castle stressed, national law created special procedural requirements for notice, hearing,
and a finding of willful violation as safeguards against abridgement of this route certifi-
cate. rd. at 63-6-1. See generally Reich, The New Property, 73 YALE L.J. 733 (1964)
(procedural safeguards protect entitlements to government benefits).
By bypassing these national procedtural safeguards, the state had imposed a "suspension
or revocation of an interstate carrier's . . . right to operate" on the public highways
specified in its certificate. 348 U.S. at 64. No comparable procedural safeguards protected
the carrier's right to use an unsafe truck in faurer. Moreover, by preempting wholesale
exclusion of a particular firm from operation in the state, Castle only prevented use of
one particular penalty for violation of the state weight-limit laws. The states' ability to
enact and enforce evenhanded safety standards for trucking equipment and operation
was only slightly restricted. Accord, City of Chicago v. Atchison, T. & S.F. R.R., 357 U.S.
77, 88-89 (1957) (city may not impose licensing scheme on interstation transfer vehicles,
but may impose "general safety regulations" for operation of vehicles).
71. See D. ENGDAHL, CONSTITUTIONAL POWER: FEDERAL AND STATE 325-27 (1974). This
broad rule of mutual exclusivity may have been a response to circumstances including
the persistent hostility of states to the national government and the relationships fostered
by national law, see, e.g., J. CALHOUN, THE FORT HILL ADDRESS 2-3 (Va. Comm'n on Const.
Gov't 1960); Warren, Federal and State Court Interference, 43 HARV. L. REV. 345, 354-57
(1930) (state opposition to fugitive slave act and federal military), and the inability of
overburdened federal courts to respond to this hostility on a case-by-case basis, see HART
& WECHSLER, suPra note 24, at 36-40, 59-60. Similar circumstances have led courts to an-
nounce a relatively broad rule of preemption in certain modern cases. See p. 388 infra.
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once Congress regulated a subject, the states could not regulate it.72
The converse therefore became doctrine as well: the only way to allow
states to protect vital interests was to deny Congress's power to protect
them.73 This doctrine of mutual exclusivity was sometimes stated only
as dictum 74 and was sometimes used to justify holdings also justifiable
on narrower grounds. 75 In preemption cases, the Court often allowed
states to protect life by regulating the participants in activity regulated
by Congress.
7 6
After 1930 the doctrine of mutual exclusivity was discarded in pre-
emption cases.77 At about the same time, the authority of Congress
generally was broadened.7 8 This expansion of congressional authority
was possible partly because the Court undertook to avoid preemption
of state protection of vital interests, while at the same time validating
national law. This approach required a painstaking examination of the
facts of each preemption case, an examination apparently not required
by the simple formula of mutual exclusivity. If the Court found that
vital interests were protected by the state law, it held that national law
72. See, e.g., Charleston S. W.C. Ry. v. Varnville Furniture Co., 237 U.S. 597, 603-04
(1915) (alternative ground).
73. See, e.g., Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238, 299 (1936); Hammer v. Dagenhart,
247 U.S. 251, 273-76 (1918), overruled, United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941). Con-
sistently applying its mutual exclusivity test to both state and federal law, the Cout
sometimes used cases addressed to state law as authority in cases addressed to national
law. See Kidd v. Pearson, 128 U.S. 1, 21 (1888) (dictum in case upholding state law;
relied on to strike down national laws in Carter and Rainner).
74. E.g., Houston v. Moore, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 1, 21-25 (1820) (stating broad rule
excluding state regulation of federal armed forces but upholding state court-martial of
militia officers for disobeying federal command); see Arnold, The Power of State Courts
to Enjoin Federal Officers, 73 YALE L.J. 1385, 1399-1401 (1964) (viewing Houston as
striking case in favor of state regulation).
75. For example, the Court declared a broad exclusivity rule in Prigg v. Pennsylvania,
41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 539, 608, 610, 617-18, 626 (1842). A national law imposed upon
magistrates a duty to aid the return of fugitive slaves into captivity. By forbidding kid-
napping, an abolitionist state law prohibited the performance of this national duty.
Prohibition of dutiful conduct, see pp. 367-69 supra, thus provided a narrower ground
for decision in Prigg.
76. The Court accomplished this result by defining narrowly the "field" that a na-
tional statute regulated. For example, Atlantic Coast Line R.R. v. Georgia, 234 U.S. 280
(1914), involved a national law requiring a large number of locomotive safety devices, but
not requiring electric headlights. State regulation of the separate field of electric locomo-
tive headlights was upheld. Id. at 293-94. Even when Congress had specifically forbidden
national agencies to impose a requirement, the Court upheld state imposition of this
same requirement to protect people from deception or physical injury. See, e.g., Savage v.
Jones, 225 U.S. 501, 532-33 (1912).
77. D. ENGDAHL, supra note 71, at 327-30. This change in formal doctrine may have
reflected the federal courts' improved administration, see HART & WECHSLER, supra note
24, at 39-41, 60-61, and consequent greater ability to make case-by-case determinations.
78. See, e.g., Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942) (upholding federal restriction on
farmer's raising of wheat for consumption on his own farm); NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin
Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937) (upholding National Labor Relations Act).
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was not preemptive, and thus not invalid. 9 If it found otherwise, pre-
emption was much more likely. This approach required scrutiny of
the duties and opportunities created by the national law to determine
whether immunizing them from state law was a necessary consequence
of enforcing national law.
Before 1930, for example, the Court in some cases had prevented
states from imposing requirements that a national agency had decided
not to impose.8 0 As congressional authority began to expand, the Court
in 1935 revised the nondelegation doctrine to limit the delegated
authority of national agencies to decide whether requirements should
be imposed."' This doctrine proved unworkable, however, and was not
used to restrict agency authority after 1936.82 At about the same time,
Maurer v. Hamilton3 unanimously upheld state imposition of a re-
quirement that a national agency had refused to impose.8 4 In 1949,
79. This policy is consistent with the Court's practice of avoiding unnecessary resolu-
tion of constitutional questions. See Ashwander v. TVA, 297 U.S. 288, 346-48 (1936)
(Brandeis, J., concurring). For a discussion of constitutional questions about the scope of
congressional power, see D. ENGDAHL, supra note 71, at 11-41, 68-70, 80-84, 95-104. A
state can still argue that national statutes are unconstitutional to the extent that they
prevent a state from protecting people inside its borders. See, e.g., Brief of Appellants at
12-15, 41-54, 63-66, Askew v. American Waterways Operators, Inc., 411 U.S. 325 (1973).
But this question need not be reached if restriction of state powers is not a necessary
effect of the national statute. See, e.g., Askew v. American Waterways Operators, Inc.,
411 U.S. 325 (1973) (unanimously denying that national statutes involved in case preempt
state law). But see pp. 368-69 supra (in some cases effect of national statute on state
protection of people cannot be denied).
80. As Congress began to delegate broad authority to national agencies, the Court
denied that the mere grant of authority itself preempted state law. Missouri, Pac. Ry. v.
Larabee Flour Mills Co., 211 U.S. 612, 623 (1909). But after the agency had exercised its
authority by imposing certain requirements, states might be barred from imposing ad-
ditional requirements. Napier v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R., 272 U.S. 605, 612-13 (1926).
Yet Missouri, Pacific may be distinguished from Napier by another factor. In Napier
the state laws attempted to protect participants in interstate commerce. 272 U.S. at
606-07. Thus the case differed from others such as Missouri, Pacific, in which a state
attempted to protect people inside the state from the conduct of participants in inter-
state commerce. See, e.g., Missouri, K. & T. Ry. v. Haber, 169 U.S. 613, 635-37 (1898)
(fact that national bureau protects against disease does not prevent state from protecting
people within state); cf. p. 372 supra (distinguishing territorial from extraterritorial
protection).
81. A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935). See gen-
erally 1 K. DAvis, ADMINIsTRATivE LAW TREATISE §§ 2.01-2.16 (1958).
82. 1 K. DAvis, supra note 81, at §§ 2.01-2.06.
83. 309 U.S. 598 (1940).
84. Id. at 602; see pp. 374-75 supra. Maurer did not, however, overtly discard the
doctrine of mutual exclusivity. Instead, it distinguished the field of state safety regula-
tion of truck size and weight from the field of ICC safety regulation of truck equipment.
It then placed "car over cab" transportation in the field subject to state regulation. 309
U.S. at 609-17. Thus, although the doctrine of mutual exclusivity did not control the
holdings of preemption cases after 1933, see D. ENGDAHL, supra note 71, at 327-30, this
doctrine influenced the reasoning of preemption decisions until California v. Zook, 336
U.S. 725, 729-33 (1949).
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California v. Zooks5 upheld state regulation of the very action regulated
by a national agency, although the state penalties for this action were
more severe than the penalties set by the agency."0 The Court ex-
plained its decision by emphasizing that the state law protected people
mostly inside its borders from fraud and physical injury.87 The Court
made it apparent that preemption of such laws was not a necessary
consequence of national regulation of this same area. 8
Since 1930 the Court has often refused to preempt state attempts at
territorial protection of vital interests.8 9 Protection of people mostly
inside state borders from physical injury has been upheld, even if the
state law in question affects interstate or international activities. ° In-
85. 336 U.S. 725 (1949).
86. Id. at 736 (state may impose more severe penalties); see id. at 746-47 & n.11, 758
(Burton, J., dissenting) (emphasizing that state penalties are more severe than federal
penalties).
87. Id. at 734-35, 737-38.
88. Id. at 729-33.
89. See note 70 supra (citing cases). The kind of interest protected by a state law thus
may be an important factor in preemption cases. If a state law "is a measure directly
addressed to protection of the public health," it "thus falls within the most traditional
concept of what is compendiously known as the police power." Head v. New Mexico Bd.
of Examiners, 374 U.S. 424, 428 (1963) (footnote omitted). Preemption of state laws that
have the effect of protecting such public interests may be found unnecessary to achieve
national statutory objectives. See, e.g., id. at 432; id. at 445-46 (Brennan, J., concurring);
Southern Pac. Co. v. Arizona ex rel Sullivan, 325 U.S. 761, 764-66 (1945) (state protection
of safety); H.P. Welch Co. v. New Hampshire, 306 U.S. 79, 85 (1939) (state protection of
safety). But ef. pp. 386-87 infra (distinguishing state protection of safety from state
assistance to one of participants in economic contest).
Environmental protection laws may protect vital interests if they regulate a health
hazard or source of personal injury. See, e.g., Huron Portland Cement Co. v. City of
Detroit, 362 U.S. 440, 442, 445 (1960). However the status of a law may change. For
example, laws aimed at marine oil pollution were once thought to protect health. See
Askew v. American Waterways Operators, Inc., 411 U.S. 325, 333 n.5 (1973). But later
studies belittled the health hazards of marine oil pollution, see G. AHERN, OIL AND THE
OUTER COASTAL SHELF: THE GEORCEs BANK CASE 75-76 (1973) (criticizing earlier study
linking oil pollution and cancer); Hunt, The Petroleum Problem, 18 OCEANUS 4, 5 (1974)
(quantities of carcinogens in oil-contaminated fish do not exceed quantities in many
human foods), and even questioned whether oil had any serious impact on the marine
environment, Abelson, Oil Spills, 195 Scr. 137 (1977). Subsequently, the Court preempted
some state oil tanker regulation, without addressing the possibility of any health hazards.
See Ray v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 435 U.S. 151 (1978).
90. See, e.g., Askew v. American Waterways Operators, Inc., 411 U.S. 325 (1973) (state
regulation of maritime liability rules for supertankers in interstate and international
trade). This deference to state law applies even when the law protects values less com-
pelling than human life. See Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132,
143 (1963) (California anti-fraud law required modification of fruit-picking schedules in
Florida); Colorado Anti-Discrimination Comm'n v. Continental Air Lines, 372 U.S. 714
(1963) (state anti-discrimination regulation of crew employment relations on interstate
airliners); Penn Dairies, Inc. v. Milk Control Comm'n, 318 U.S. 261, 275 (1943) (state
regulation of milk supply raising cost of United States government operations during war-
time national emergency).
Advocates of preemption frequently argue that there is a "dominant federal interest" in
interstate or international activities, and that this interest requires the preemption of
state laws affecting these activities. See, e.g., Brief of Respondents at 2-9, DeCanas v. Bica,
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novative laws have thus been upheld because they protect people inside
state borders against serious dangers, even if the dangers spring from a
new technological or social development. 9' Such innovative laws have
come within the scope of what the Court calls "the tradition of 'usual
police powers.' "92
Although it almost appears that there is a general rule against the
preemption of state laws protecting the vital interests of state citizens,
two cases suggest that this rule is not absolute, and that special cir-
cumstances can sometimes lead to preemption of even these laws. In
Minnesota v. Northern States Power Co., 93 the Supreme Court issued
a memorandum affirmance of a lower court decision immunizing
nuclear power plants from state control of radioactive emissions. The
national statute involved was expressly designed, inter alia, "to en-
424 U.S. 351 (1976); Brief of the United States as Amicus Curiae at 23-35, Head v. New
Mexico Bd. of Examiners, 374 U.S. 424 (1963). But see, e.g., DeCanas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351,
355-56 (1976) (regulation of employment of illegal aliens protects workers inside state and
is therefore within state's "broad authority'); Head v. New Mexico Bd. of Examiners, 374
U.S. 424, 428-32 (1963) (state law protects health and is matter of "fundamentally local con-
cern'). This argument ignores the crucial question in preemption cases. According to the
supremacy clause, U.S. CONsT. art. VI, § 2, the duty to give effect to a valid national law
is always dominant over "contrary" state laws. The crucial question is whether state law
is contrary to national law, so that preemption of state law is necessary to give effect to
the national law. See pp. 382-83 infra. But see Hirsch, supra note 2, at 530, 532 (presence
of "dominant" federal interest is objective "factor" in decision on preemption question).
The argument that preemption turns on the presence or absence of a "dominant"
federal interest is based on a dictum in Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230
(1947) ("Act of Congress may touch a field in which the federal interest is so dominant"
that preemption is necessary). Cf. note 29 supra (Rice dictum about "pervasive national
regulation"). The holding of Rice rested on application of an express preemption clause,
331 U.S. at 229. This dictum was supported only by a citation to Hines v. Davidowitz, 312
U.S. 52 (1941); but in Hines the state law regulated "perfectly law abiding" aliens, rather
than protecting against some threat to the state's residents. Id. at 66.
Recently, Hines served as authority for the decision in a case in which state courts
discriminated among aliens to induce foreign governments to recognize the ownership
rights of United States citizens in general. Zschernig v. Miller, 389 U.S. 429 (1968); see
pp. 372-74 & note 60 supra (discussion of extraterritorial protection). In contrast, a state
law with international repercussions may be upheld if it protects people mostly inside state
borders. See DeCanas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351, 355-57 (1976) (state regulation of employment
of illegal immigrants); Askew v. American Waterways Operators, Inc., 411 U.S. 325, 327,
338-39 (1973) (state regulation of shipping). But cf. Ray v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 435
U.S. 151, 166-67 (1978) (congressional support for international specification of oil tanker
design standards militates against state regulation).
91. For example, interstate car pools posed a novel threat to safety, to which
California had responded for only a few years before California v. Zook, 336 U.S. 725
(1949), was decided. Despite its short history, this response was upheld. Id. at 734-37; see,
e.g., DeCanas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351, 352 & n.1 (1976) (state law enacted in 1971 to
respond to problem of employment of illegal aliens); Askew v. American Waterways
Operators, Inc., 411 U.S. 325, 335, 341-43 (1973) (state regulation of oil spill liability rules
in response to development and increasing use of supertankers).
92. California v. Zook, 336 U.S. 725, 734 (1949); see DeCanas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351,
354-57 (1976); Askew v. American Waterways Operators, Inc., 411 U.S. 325, 328-29, 333-43
(1973).
93. 405 U.S. 1035 (1972) (affirming 447 F.2d 1143 (8th Cir. 1971)).
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courage maximum scientific and industrial progress"04 and "to en-
courage widespread participation in the development and utilization
of atomic energy for peaceful purposes to the maximum extent con-
sistent with the common defense and security and with the health and
safety of the public."5 To prevent hindrance of the activities of the
Atomic Energy Commission directed at these objectives, the Court
preempted state regulation despite the possibility that lax regulation
by the Commission would endanger human life.96 In Ray v. Atlantic
Richfield Co.,97 the Court immunized oil tankers from state regula-
tion of vessel equipment and size. According to the Court, the national
statute had the objective of securing an international, uniform system
of regulation for these vessel safety features.98 To prevent hindrance
of Coast Guard conduct directed at this objective, the Court preempted
state regulation99 despite the possibility that lax Coast Guard regula-
tion would result in oil pollution, thus perhaps 00 endangering human
life.
These two cases may be read to indicate that there exists only a
heavy presumption against preemption of state laws protecting vital
interests. This presumption was overcome by the presence of several
factors in addition to the problem of state restriction of a federal
agency's ability to achieve a national statutory objective.10 1 First, the
development of the industry hindered by state law was important to
national security. Because it was initially developed by the federal
government, and because it is so closely linked to national security,
the use of atomic energy is arguably much more a matter of federal
concern than are other activities of public utilities. 10 2 Similarly, the
tankers that Washington state sought to regulate are crucial links be-
tween the Trans-Alaska pipeline and the "lower 48" states, and thus
94. Atomic Energy Act of 1954, § 3(a), 42 U.S.C. § 2013(a) (1970).
95. Id. § 3(d), 42 U.S.C. § 2013(d) (1970).
96. 405 U.S. 1035 (1972) (affirming 447 F.2d 1143 (8th Cir. 1971)).
97. 435 U.S. 151 (1978).
98. Id. at 163, 166-68 (discussing 46 U.S.C. §§ 391a(7)(B)-(D) (Supp. V 1975)).
99. See 435 U.S. at 168-69, 178 (invalidating state design requirements and tanker size
limit; upholding state tugboat escort requirements).
100. Some researchers recently have belittled the possibility that oil spills endanger
human health. See G. AHERN, supra note 89, at 75-76; Hunt, supra note 89, at 5. In its
brief defending the tanker law, Washington state never asserted that oil spills en-
dangered human health, but instead focused on the effect of spills on fisheries and
recreational opportunities. See Brief of Appellants at 11-17, Ray v. Atlantic Richfield Co.,
435 U.S. 151 (1978). In deciding the case the Court did not mention any possibility of
health hazards.
101. See p. 379 supra.
102. See Northern States Power Co. v. Minnesota, 447 F.2d 1143, 1148 (8th Cir. 1971),
affd mem., 405 U.S. 1035 (1972) (noting congressional findings on need for regulation to
provide for "common defense and security").
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are important to the national effort to limit dependence on foreign
oil.15 Second, the federal statute at issue itself provided adequate
protection for the vital interests at stake. The laws involved in
Northern States and Ray both sought, among other things, to protect
the public from accidents, 104 and in both cases this purpose had been
implemented by extensive regulations. 05 Third, a national agency had
decided to permit the conduct forbidden by the state. 06 Finally, Ray
may be read to require that the federal program allow for adequate
attention to local needs and variations.' 07 Under these unusual cir-
cumstances, the states' authority to protect vital interests was overcome
by the need to achieve urgent national objectives.
Nationai objectives have also required preemption of state attempts
to protect people from certain forms of economic duress. The national
labor laws were designed in part to protect peaceful union conduct. 08
Yet as recently as 1950 the Court upheld state protection of employers
against peaceful union conduct on the grounds that this conduct
amounted to economic duress.109 Eventually the Court preempted
state attempts to protect employers from labor organizations." 0 The
Court has refused, however, to deprive individual strikebreakers,"'
individual union members,"x2 and even individual supervisory em-
103. See Brief of Appellees at 4-5, Ray v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 435 U.S. 151 (1978); cf.
H.R. REP. No. 414, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 9-11 (1973) (authorization for trans-Alaska pipe-
line necessary to avoid "crippling fuel shortages" and to protect national security).
104. See p. 380 supra (statute in Northern States); Ray v. Atlantic Richfield Co.,
435 U.S. 151, 165 (1978) (law "aims at insuring vessel safety and protecting the marine
environment").
105. See Ray v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 435 U.S. 151, 162 nn.l1-12, 170-71 (Coast Guard
implementation); Northern States Power Co. v. Minnesota, 447 F.2d 1143, 1153 (8th Cir.
1971), aff'd mem., 405 U.S. 1035 (1972) (regulations of Atomic Energy Commission).
106. See Northern States Power Co. v. Minnesota, 447 F.2d 1143, 1145 (8th Cir. 1971),
aff'd mere., 405 U.S. 1035 (1972) (Commission had approved construction of plant with
radioactive discharge levels forbidden by state). In Ray, the Coast Guard had rejected
the design requirements imposed by the state, Brief of Appellants at 16-17, Ray v. Atlantic
Richfield Co., 435 U.S. 151 (1978), and had decided that restrictions on large tankers were
necessary in only part of Puget Sound, whereas the state had sought to ban these tankers
from the entire Sound. Ray v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 435 U.S. 151, 174-75, 178 (1978).
107. See 435 U.S. at 169-72 (state was still allowed to require pilots for entering and
leaving port and to require tug escort; federal scheme also provided for detailed regula-
tion of particular ports and watervays).
108. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 151, 157, 158(a) (1970).
109. See Building Serv. Emplo)ees Local 262 v. Gazzam, 339 U.S. 532 (1950) (injunction
against peaceful picketing found to prevent duress and upheld against First Amendment
attack); UAW Local 232 v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Bd., 336 U.S. 245 (1949)
(state prohibition of peaceful partial strikes is not preempted).
110. See Lodge 76, Int'l Ass'n of Machinists v. Wisconsin Employment Relations
Comm'n, 427 U.S. 132 (1976); Street, Elec. Ry. & Motor Coach Employees Div. 998 v.
Wisconsin Employment Relations Bd., 340 U.S. 383 (1951).
111. See UAW v. Russell, 356 U.S. 634 (1958).
112. See Farmer v. Carpenters Local 25, 430 U.S. 290 (1977) (union member's damage
suit for infliction of emotional distress); Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171 (1966) (damage suit
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ployees," 5 of state protection against labor organizations. The Court
has similarly refused to preempt state protection of "public safety and
order."" 4 To explain such refusals, the Court has declared that state
protection of this type cannot be preempted in the absence of "com-
pelling Congressional direction." 11
B. Inference of the Federal Objective
If hindrance of the achievement of a national objective is to be
found, it is necessary to know what that federal objective is. Some
statutes expressly state their overall objectives in a "declaration of
policy" or of "purpose,"'"" or in sections that declare that certain
policies are for "the public convenience and necessity.""17 But not all
national statutes have such clauses. Without them, deciding the ques-
tion of preemption requires an inference of the overall statutory
objective.
The process of inferring an objective is both restrained and simpli-
fied by the fact that only a command with the force of national law
has been deemed to override state law. The Constitution grants Con-
gress a number of opportunities to regulate such activities as interstate
commerce."" It also grants Congress the authority "to make all Laws
which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution the
foregoing Powers."11 9 Since the Constitution commands that the laws of
the United States shall be the supreme law of the land and that the
for breach of duty of fair representation). But see Street, Elec. Ry. & Motor Coach Em-
ployees v. Lockridge, 403 U.S. 274 (1971) (employee may not maintain state court suit
against union for persuading employer to fire employee on grounds of nonpayment of
union dues).
113. See Linn v. Plant Guard Workers Local 114, 383 U.S. 53 (1966).
114. Allen-Bradley Local 1111 v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Bd., 315 U.S. 740,
749 (1942).
115. San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236, 244 (1959) (dictum)
(citing cases in which refusing to preempt allowed states to protect citizens' rights to
shelter and livelihood). This standard for the preemption of laws fundamental to state
responsibility thus resembles the Court's standard for the restriction of opportunities
fundamental to individual livelihood. See Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 658-61
(1969) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (citing cases in which exercise of rights enabled people to
obtain food, shelter, and other necessities of life).
116. See, e.g., 7 U.S.C. §§ 361a-361b (1976) (statute fostering agricultural research); 15
U.S.C. § 1451 (1976) (Fair Packaging and Labeling Act); 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1970) (National
Labor Relations Act); 47 U.S.C. . 301 (1970) (statute regulating radio communications).
117. E.g., 49 U.S.C. § 1303 (1970) (statute fostering commercial aviation); see 33 U.S.C.
§ 1221 (Supp. V 1975) (initial section states that statute is enacted "to prevent damage to"
vessels and structures and "to protect" environment).
118. U.S. CONSr. art. I, § 8.
119. Id. cl. 18; see D. ENGDAHL, supra note 71, at 11-41, 68-70, 80-84, 95-104 (sources of
congressional ability to restrict private conduct or state regulation that affects activities
subject to congressional regulation).
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judiciary shall give effect to that law,120 judges have a duty to give
effect to each national statute, construed in light of these constitutional
grants of authority. The Constitution does not, however, impose a
comparable duty to give effect to declarations in legislative history. 121
Focusing on the statute itself and on the constitutional grant of
power under which it was passed has been a workable method for de-
termining the objectives of statutes that lack clauses declaring their
purposes. In Wissner v. Wissner,122 for example, a federal statute had
granted military personnel "the right to designate the beneficiary" of
their national service life insurance policies, 2 3 thereby increasing the
benefits of enlistment in the military. Noting the constitutional power
to raise armies, 12 4 but without considering legislative history, the
120. U.S. CONsT. art. VI, § 2; see Hirsch, supra note 2, at 515; Note, supra note 2, at
623-24 & n.7.
121. Justice Jackson questioned the extent to which courts should consider legislative
history when construing statutes:
The Constitution evidently intended Congress itself to reduce the conflicting and
tentative views of its members to an agreed formula. It [is] expected to speak its will
with considerable formality, after deliberation assured by three readings in each
House. Its exact language requires Executive approval, or enough support to over-
ride a veto. How far, then, should this formal text and contract be qualified or
amplified by expressions of one or several Congressmen in reports or debates which
did not find place in the enactment itself?
Jackson, The Meaning of Statutes: What Congress Says or What the Court Says, 34
A.B.A.J. 535, 538 (1948). The Court has frequently refused to conform its holdings to
declarations in legislative history. See note 5 supra. Compare Brief of Respondents at
16, 19-20, DeCanas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351 (1976) (employment of illegal aliens was con-
gressionally immunized from punishment) and Brief for Respondents at 11-13, Kewanee
Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470 (1974) (legislative commentary favoring disclosure
of trade secrets) with DeCanas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351, 357 (1976) (ouster of state authority
must be clear and manifest) and Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 483, 493
(1974) (Congress by silence has allowed states to prohibit disclosure of trade secrets). It
has explained its decisions by declaring that
[a]n unexpressed purpose of Congress to set aside statutes of the states regulating their
internal affairs is not lightly to be inferred . . . . Considerations which lead us not
to favor repeal of statutes by implication . . . should be at least as persuasive when
the question is one of the nullification of state power by Congressional legislation.
Penn Dairies, Inc. v. Milk Control Comm'n, 318 U.S. 261, 275 (1943) (citations omitted).
Legislative commentary need not be regarded as authoritative, partly because the ob-
jectives of a national statute can be inferred from the structure of duties (and coincident
rights) expressly created by the statute itself. See, e.g., p. 384 infra. The express
commands of a statute thus amount to an "instruction to administrators and courts to
accomplish a definite result, usually the securing or maintaining of recognized social,
political, or economic values." Radin, A Short Way with Statutes, 56 HARv. L. REV. 388,
407 (1942); see H. HART & A. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS 1144, 1156-57, 1285-86 (ed. 1958)
(describing rules for implementing overall objective of statute); Frankfurter, Some Re-
flections on the Reading of Statutes, 47 COLUM. L. REV. 527, 538-39 (1947) (distinguish-
ing "purpose" of law from legislators' intention); Radin, supra, at 409, 418-23 (discussing
concept of "purpose"); Radin, Statutory Interpretation, 43 HARv. L. REV. 863 873 (1930)
(opposing reliance on legislative history) [hereinafter cited as Statutory Interpretation].
122. 338 U.S. 655 (1950).
123. National Service Life Insurance Act of 1940, ch. 757, tit. VI, § 601(g), 54 Stat. 1008
(current version at 38 U.S.C. § 717 (1970)).
124. U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 12.
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Court discerned the overall objective of the statute: maintaining
military morale. 125 The Court then preempted a state community
property rule that halved the benefits controlled by the national grant
of rights to enlisted persons. 126
Focusing on legislative history, in contrast, often introduces ambigui-
ties into the process of deciding preemption cases. As Justice Jackson
observed, "[i]t is a poor cause that cannot find some plausible support
in legislative history."'127 In Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v.
Paul,128 the dissenting Justices found congressional support for "uni-
formity of regulatory programs" in the legislative history. 12 9 But the
majority focused on the statute itself. The statute's "declaration of
policy" sought to achieve parity prices for the benefit of producers, a
steady flow of produce to consumers, and such produce standards and
inspection procedures "as will be in the public interest."'30 By focus-
ing on the legislature's authoritative statement, 31 the Court resolved
the ambiguity: uniformity should be valued only to the extent that it
was necessary to further the interests expressed in this statement. With-
out considering legislative history 32 the Court had already found no
necessity for "exclusive federal regulation in order to achieve uni-
formity vital to national interests."' 33 The interests expressed by
Congress in the statute could be achieved without depriving con-
sumers of state protection against deception. 34 The Court therefore
refused to deprive states of the power to protect these people, "in the
absence of an unambiguous congressional mandate."' 35
C. Inference of Necessity and Hindrance
Once the national objective is found, it is necessary to determine
whether the state law in question substantially hinders conduct neces-
125. 338 U.S. at 660.
126. Id. at 661.
127. Jackson, supra note 121, at 538; see id. ("legislative history . . . often includes
tentative rather than final views of legislators or leaves misrepresentation unanswered").
The ambiguity of legislative histories often arises from the fact that legislators haic many
diverse reasons for their votes on a given bill, see Murdock v. City of Memphis, 87 U.S.
(20 Wall.) 590, 618-19 (1875); Statutory Intertpretation, supra note 121, at 870-71.
128. 373 U.S. 132 (1963).
129. Id. at 170, 175 (White, J., dissenting).
130. 7 U.S.C. § 602 (1976).
131. 373 U.S. at 138, 147.
132. The Court instead derived its conclusion from an examination of the "subject
matter," which it presented as an alternative to a search for an "explicit declaration of
congressional design to displace state regulation." Id. at 143. "Subject matter" anal)sis
attempts to determine whether making national regulation of an activity exclusive is
necessary to achieve an express statutory objective. See pp. 387-88 & note 157 infra.
133. 373 U.S. at 144; see notes 157 & 160 infra.
134. See 373 U.S. at 145-47.
135. Id. at 146-47.
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sary to the achievement of that objective. To determine whether con-
duct is necessary to achieve a statutory objective, the Court has focused
on the conduct itself. As Florida Lime and Free v. Bland'30 demon-
strate, fraud or deception may be found unnecessary. The Court has
repeatedly refused, as it did in Maurer v. Hamilton137 and California
v. Zook, 138 to deem the endangering of human life to be necessary to
achievement of the statutory objective.' 39 In considering whether
human needs should be deprived of the protection of state law, the
Court has also asked whether national law establishes an adversarial
system to protect all these needs.1
4 0
Thus states have been able to restrict opportunities for dangerous
conduct left unrestricted by national law.' 4 ' In fact, a deliberate na-
tional refusal to impose the restrictions imposed by states has been
used as a reason to uphold such state restrictions. 142 Under certain
conditions, however, relatively lenient regulation by a national agency
may be found necessary to protect national interests, and may therefore
preempt state attempts to provide increased protection for the vital
interests of state residents.
43
136. 369 U.S. 663, 670 (1962) (exception read into national bond regulations to avoid
immunizing fraud from prohibition).
137. 309 U.S. 598 (1940); see pp. 374-75 suPra.
138. 336 U.S. 725 (1949); see p. 378 supra.
139. See pp. 374-78 & notes 70, 76, 89 supra (citing cases); cf. p. 368 supra (pro-
tection given to life as factor even in cases involving prohibition of dutiful conduct).
140. See p. 368 & note 24 supra. This protective adversarial system may be an aspect
of private economic competition, of the relationship between two government agencies,
or of the procedural rules of a single agency. A private adversarial system of economic
competition may be adequate to protect certain public interests. For example, the con-
sumer interest in inexpensive goods may be protected by an employer's resistance to
union wage demands or by a manufacturer's copying of an unpatentable invention with-
out the inventor's permission. See p. 386 infra ("economic balance" cases).
In contrast, "public safety and order" may require direct governmental protection. See
pp. 381-82 supra (subjects of state protection). An adversarial government arrangement
may be necessary to provide adequate opportunities for case-by-case representation and
protection of all interests. No such adversarial system was present in Head v. New
Mexico Bd. of Examiners, 374 U.S. 424 (1963). where -a national statute "centralizing
authority" in the FCC to restrict and to foster commercial radio, 47 U.S.C. §§ 151, 301-
303 (1970), did not preempt state protection of listeners' health. See 374 U.S. at 428-32;
id. at 437-38, 446-47 (Brennan, J., concurring). By contrast, the adversarial relationship
between the Environmental Protection Agency and the Federal Aviation Administra-
tion provides an arrangement protecting both the safety and the quiet of localities. City
of Burbank v. Lockheed Air Terminal, Inc., 411 U.S. 624, 629-32, 638-39 (1973). Alterna-
tively, a single agenc)'s adiersarial procedural s)stem may protect diverse interests. In
San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236 (1959), the NLRB was available
to provide both unions and management with representation in a quasi-judicial system.
141. See, e.g., Askew v. American Waterways Operators, Inc., 411 U.S. 325, 334-36
(1973); Youngdahl v. Rainfair, 355 U.S. 131 (1957); H.P. Welch Co. v. New Hampshire,
309 U.S. 79, 85 (1939); Reid v. Colorado, 187 U.S. 137, 148-50 (1902).
142. See, e.g., note 76 supra (citing cases); Head v. New Mexico Bd. of Examiners, 3741
U.S. 424, 444 (Brennan, J., concurring) (national refusal to regulate nondeceptive ad-
vertising). But cf. note 31 supra (contradictory cases).
143. See pp. 379-81 supra.
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In a large number of cases, conduct has been deemed necessary not
because of its individual contribution to a national objective, but be-
cause its interaction with the conduct of business competitors serves
that objective. In these "economic balance" cases, which have involved
federal patent law,144 labor law,145 securities law,14 6 and vessel licensing
law, 147 the conduct in question has four main characteristics. First,
state regulation of this conduct was intended primarily as an aid to one
party in a private economic contest. Second, the conduct itself was
aimed at counteracting the actions of adversaries, thus creating an
economic balance of power. Third, the process of economic com-
petition served a national statutory objective. Fourth, the conduct
immunized from state law was not fraudulent or dangerous to life. 48
Determining the effect of a state law on the achievement of a national
statutory objective requires analysis of each feature of the state law.
The state law at issue in the 1941 case of Reitz v. Mealy,149 for example,
deprived financially irresponsible tortfeasors of their driver's licenses.
It also allowed them to prove financial responsibility by paying the
tort claim. National bankruptcy law, however, discharged the debts of
certain insolvent tortfeasors. The Court upheld the application of state
law to these tortfeasors, stressing that it was not in derogation of na-
tional law because it was "not for the protection of the creditor merely"
but instead for the protection of public safety.150
In 1962 the state law challenged in Kesler v. Department of Public
144. See, e.g., Compco Corp. v. Day-Brite Lighting Inc., 376 U.S. 234 (1964).
145. See, e.g., Lodge 76, Int'l Ass'n of Machinists v. Wisconsin Employment Relations
Comm'n, 427 U.S. 132 (1976).
146. See Great Western United Corp. v. Kidwell, 577 F.2d 1256 (5th Cir. 1978).
147. See Douglas v. Seacoast Prods., Inc., 431 U.S. 265 (1977). The objective of the
licensing statute in Douglas is unclear unless one reads the statute in light of the
commerce clause, from which can be inferred the objective of national "economic in-
terdependence," C. BLACK, STRUCTURE AND RELATIONSHIP IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAw 20,
21, 27-29 (1969); see pp. 382-84 supra (rationale and example of reading statutes in
light of constitutional grants of authority).
148. Under such circumstances, preemption is necessary. For example, when the
developers of certain unpatentable inventions used state unfair competition laws to
prevent the manufacture of less expensive copies, thus gaining an advantage in their
battle with competitors and interfering with pursuit of the national objective of pro-
moting science and the useful arts, state law was invalidated. See Compco Corp. v. Day-
Brite Lighting Inc., 376 U.S. 234, 238-39 (1964); Goldstein, The Competitive Mandate:
From Sears to Lear, 59 CALIF. L. REV. 873, 875-81, 883-86, 903 (1971). In contrast, because
the conduct of employees who established a competing company using the trade secrets of
their former employer was found to endanger "the basic decency of society," Kewanee
Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 485-87 (1974), that conduct threatened vital interests
and was therefore not immunized from state prohibitions. Id. at 493.
149. 314 U.S. 33 (1941).
150. Id. at 36-37.
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Safety' 5 1 added a new feature. This law allowed a judgment creditor
to authorize issuance of a driver's license to the bankrupt tortfeasor
before the tortfeasor proved financial responsibility. It could be argued
that this new feature did no more than give the creditor a bargaining
weapon to induce partial payment of debts discharged in bankruptcy
and thus to deny effect to national bankruptcy law.' 52 But the Court
still relied on Reitz and upheld the state law as a safety measure.
Not until 1971 did Perez v. Campbell' 53 invalidate such a law to the
extent that it enabled creditors to hinder debtors from making the
fresh start sought by national bankruptcy law.
1 54
D. Determination of the Breadth of the Preemption Ruling
Once it has determined that state regulation substantially hinders
conduct necessary to a national objective, a court must decide whether
to enunciate a narrow or broad rule of preemption. Many preemp-
tion cases produce holdings limited to the particular state regulation
in question. However in some cases, involving air commerce at pro-
prietary airports'5 5 and labor-management relations,15 6 four features
of the subject matter' 57 being regulated combined to create a need
for the preemption of a whole category of state or local law. First, the
national statute has the express and central purpose of fostering a
particular relationship. Second, the statute organizes an adversarial
agency decisionmaking process that ensures protection from unrea-
151. 369 U.S. 163 (1962).
152. Id. at 181-82 (Warren, CJ., dissenting).
153. 402 U.S. 637 (1971).
154. Id. at 644-49, 653-54.
155. See City of Burbank v. Lockheed Air Terminal, Inc., 411 U.S. 624 (1973) (pro-
tecting FAA efforts to foster air commerce among states). Burbank involhed a municipal
ordinance that threatened the safety of air travelers, id. at 639, rather than protecting vital
interests.
156. See, e.g., San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236 (1959) (pro-
tecting NLRB efforts to foster relations between companies and unions). The labor pre-
emption cases ha%e not deprived states of authority to protect vital interests, such as
public safety. See pp. 381-82 supra.
157. The Court's examination of "subject" or "subject matter" appears to be an at-
tempt to consider the practical problems of implementing a federal statute regulating a
particular relationship, and to decide whether that relationship must be wholly im-
munized from state and local regulation in order to achieve national statutory objectives.
San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236, 241-44 (1959), in which the
Court discussed the need for wholesale exclusion of state authority, has accordingly been
cited as involving a "subject demanding exclusive federal regulation." Florida Lime
& Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 143-44 (1963); see City of Burbank v.
Lockheed Air Terminal, Inc., 411 U.S. 624, 625 (1973) (referring to subject of regulation
as guide for preemption). But ef. Note, supra note 2, at 625 n.18 (criticizing considerations
of subject matter as anomalous in preemption cases).
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sonable conduct by the parties to the relationship. 15 Third, states
and localities have persistently demonstrated a hostility toward this
relationship. Finally, there are circumstances that prevent an adequate
case-by-case national response to each instance of state and local hos-
tility.159 By adopting a broad rule of wholesale preemption under
such circumstances, the Court has barred states and localities from
attempting to prove that they can regulate the relationship in question
reasonably, without hostility.' 6
0
In contrast to the inference of the statutory objective, the inference
of the necessity for conduct and the inference of the effect of state law
take place without specific congressional guidance. Arguably the Court
should not engage in determining necessity and substantial hindrance.
But Congress cannot always foresee how state laws will obstruct the
achievement of national statutory goals.' 61 Courts must inquire into
158. See p. 385 & note 140 supra (types of adversarial system).
159. City of Burbank v. Lockheed Air Terminal, Inc., 411 U.S. 624 (1973), is the
harder case and should be examined in detail. First, a national statute declared that the
fostering of commercial aviation accords with "the public convenience and necessity," 49
U.S.C. § 1303 (1970). Second, another national statute created a process by which
the Environmental Protection Agency acted as an advocate, protecting against noise
pollution by scrutinizing the Federal Aviation Administration's airflight schedules. 411
U.S. at 629-32, 638-39. Third, courts had repeatedly been called on to invalidate exces-
sively restrictive municipal noise curfews for airports. See, e.g., United States v. City of
New Haven, 447 F.2d 972 (2d Cir. 1971); American Airlines v. City of Audubon Park,
297 F. Supp. 207 (W.D. Ky. 1968), aff'd, 407 F.2d 1306 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 366 U.S.
845 (1969). Fourth, the significant number of localities that could restrict airflights
helped persuade the Court that the subject demanded an "exclusive system of federal
regulation." 411 U.S. at 625, 627-28, 639. But see id. at 653 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting)
(FAA administrator could cope with hostility case-by-case); cf. id. at 635-36 & n.14 (decision
not applicable to all airports).
160. See e.g., San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236, 241-46 (1959);
Garner v. Teamsters Local 776, 346 U.S. 485, 498-99 (1953). Because it leaves no residue of
state authority, a holding of "subject matter" preemption is broader in effect than in-
validation on commerce clause grounds. The commerce clause allows state legislatures to
retain their ability to enact laws striking a reasonable balance between federal and state
interests. See Southern Pac. Co. v. Arizona ex rel. Sullivan, 325 U.S. 761, 775-78 (1945);
Dowling, Interstate Commerce and State Power, 27 VA. L. REV. 1, 21-27 (1940). Moreover,
holdings on commerce clause grounds can he overruled by Congress, G. GUNTHER, CASES
AND MATERIALS ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 367-71 (9th ed. 1975), and thus are no more
permanent than a preemption tuling. But see Douglas v. Seacoast Prods., Inc., 431 U.S.
265, 272 & n.6 (1977) (preemption is statutory ground, addressed first because it can be
congiessionally overruled). The greater breadth and equal permanence of preemption
holdings justify the Court's occasional refusal to rest on preemption grounds rather than
commerce clause grounds. See, e.g., Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373
U.S. 132, 152, 156 (1963) (finding no preemption; remanding on commerce clause issue);
Southern Pac. Co. v. Arizona ex rel. Sullivan, 325 U.S. 761, 764-66, 775-78 (1945) (finding
no preemption; inalidating law on commerce clause grounds). But see Note, supra note
70, at 225 (adlocating ieliance on preemption grounds).
161. See San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236, 240 (1959) (many
preemption problems "probably could not have been, at all events were not, foreseen by
the Congress"). See also Frankfurter, suPra note 121, at 538-39 (author of Garmon
stressing need to achieve purpose of national statutes).
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these questions in order to give full effect to national statutes. Yet
preempting every state law that somehow hinders choices among na-
tionally unrestricted opportunities or performance of national duties
could mean "setting aside great numbers of state statutes to satisfy a
congressional purpose which would only be the product of this Court's
imagination. "102 Therefore the Court has attempted "to reconcile 'the
operation of both statutory schemes with one another rather than
holding one completely ousted.' ",103 The Court will preempt state law




State laws protecting vital state interests are generally preserved by
a heavy presumption against preemption. These laws have been pre-
empted only in cases involving express preemption and prohibition of
dutiful conduct, and in very rare cases of hindrance of national policy.
Even state attempts at territorial protection of less-than-vital interests
have received considerable protection. In a large number of cases na-
tional and state governments have been allowed to work together to
protect people inside state borders. Some of the credit for this protec-
tion must go to the Supreme Court, which in preemption cases has
attempted to ensure that both governments could perform their funda-
mental functions. 16 5
162. California v. Zook, 336 U.S. 725, 732-33 (1949); see notes 79 & 121 supra (reasons
for refusing to find preemption when congressional purpose is unclear).
163. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith v. Ware, 414 U.S. 117, 127 (1973) (quoting
Silver v. New York Stock Exch., 373 U.S. 341, 357 (1963)).
164. Id. at 126-27.
165. See note 115 subra. See generally Michelman, States' Rights and States' Roles:
Permutations of "Sovereignty" in National League of Cities v. Usery, 86 YALE L.J. 1165,
1172-74, 1180 (1977); Tribe, Unraveling National League of Cities: The New Federalism
and Affirmative Rights to Essential Government Services, 90 HARV. L. Rav. 1065, 1172-74,
1180 (1977).
